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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

CONTENTS

Page

REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

Egypt 2

Mongolia 7

New Zealand 10

Republic of Korea 14

93-11299 3874j (E) 020393 020393

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Egypt

[Original: Arabic]

[23 February 1993]

1. In recent times, the international community has witnessed numerous global changes, the most important being the collapse of the totalitarian system in the States of Eastern Europe, the diminishing intensity of the East-West conflict, the end of the cold war between the two super-Powers and the containment of the ideological dispute between them to the areas of influence.

2. Egypt believes that the changes witnessed by the international community should prompt international arms limitation measures, for in addition to détente, the world is seeing a new trend, exemplified in the attempts to develop qualitatively various weapons systems and to acquire weapons of all types. The responsibility for confronting and curbing this trend thus devolves upon the United Nations.

3. The United Nations must accordingly strengthen its role and increase its contacts in order to mobilize international efforts with a view to enhancing disarmament measures for development, converting military industries to civilian industries and making military expenditure available to serve the purposes of development, particularly in third world countries, which continue to face numerous problems, such as famine, poverty, desertification and so forth. On this basis, Egypt affirms the importance of the issues of disarmament for development, the conversion of military industries to civilian industries and the essential role of the United Nations in that respect.

4. Egypt supports United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament aimed at achieving the purposes and objectives of full and total disarmament. It also endorses the role undertaken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to further this concept, particularly at the present time when radical changes are being witnessed in the international arena, which should be accompanied by corresponding international efforts to instil and promote the principles of disarmament and a reduction in the international arms race. Egypt is therefore grateful to the Secretary-General for preparing the study entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" and for its methodological framework which defines the relationship between disarmament and international peace and security in terms of integration, globalization and revitalization.

5. Commenting on some of the principles contained in the study which must be built on, and particularly on the vital issues discussed, Egypt would like to make the following observations:

(a) Although the report theoretically advocates that a global approach should broadly apply to all States, in several instances it fails to stress the need to ensure that, in that process, the element of "fairness" is applied to all States without distinction or exception. It also omits to discuss the factor of ensuring balanced application to all types of arms, having concentrated in several places on dealing with the issue of conventional weapons, which many States believe continue to form the foundation of their national security. This view is held at the expense of international concern with regard to nuclear weapons, which are undoubtedly the major source of danger to international peace and security. That much is affirmed in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament in 1978, which defined the priorities in disarmament negotiations as nuclear weapons, followed by weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, conventional weapons and the reduction of armed forces). Paragraph 47 of the same document also specifies that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization, which is consistent with the purposes and objectives of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) dated 24 November 1961, which declares that the use of nuclear weapons is considered contrary to the rules of international law and a crime against mankind. Although we agree with the indication contained in the Secretary-General's report that great success has been achieved in the field of disarmament, we should like to affirm that such success is seen as a serious and positive step which must be followed by more sweeping steps, particularly concerning the ban on nuclear testing aimed at qualitatively improving certain nuclear weapons systems. This aim is inconsistent with the features of the new international order in terms of international cooperation, overlapping interests, collective security and enhanced security.

(b) In connection with the preceding paragraph, Egypt affirms the need to create a balance in the treatment of the different types and systems of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, together with the need to deal with the various types of components of weapons of mass destruction. Despite the existence of agreements covering those weapons, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it should be noted that some of those binding legal instruments lack universality. For instance, nuclear activities in some States are well advanced, one example being Israel, which has not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Similarly, its nuclear activity has not yet been subject to guarantees by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which creates a situation of imbalance in the Middle East region. Egypt therefore endorses adoption of the principle of applying fairness between States by dealing with the disparate military and technological capabilities of the States in the region and taking into account their stockpiles and potential for indigenous production. On that basis, Egypt stresses the need for international verification measures, the importance of such measures and the role of international agencies in taking an inventory of State activities and verifying information submitted in that respect.

(c) In the context of discussing international verification measures, Egypt takes this opportunity to reaffirm the importance of ensuring that all international agreements dealing with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction include precise rules in order to ascertain that the provisions of such agreements are properly implemented. Such rules must be characterized by effective and credible measures to which all parties should be subject on an equal basis. Egypt also believes in the importance of conducting a periodic review of the verification rules in force in order to identify any failings which emerge in practice. There is no doubt that the verification element is regarded as a basic component both of multilateral agreements and of all international, regional and bilateral initiatives with regard to all types of weapons disarmament. This is now possible in an era where the spirit of cooperation and the endeavour to secure common interests prevail.

(d) The Middle East has historic significance in the negotiation and implementation of disarmament measures because of its direct relationship to international peace and security. This is confirmed by the multilateral negotiations on arms limitation, in view of the nature of this region and its conflicts and challenges. Here Egypt stresses the importance of following up the Secretary-General's report on the recommendations in paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament of 1978 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which would enhance international peace and security in the region. All States of the Middle East should declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear installations under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to promote the role of the Security Council in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(e) In this context, mention should also be made of Egypt's firm conviction of the importance of eliminating the hazards of the proliferation of all three types of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East in order to avoid the States of the region being swept up in a frantic competition to acquire such weapons, which would lead to the squandering of resources and opportunities for achieving prosperity for their peoples and constitute a grave threat to peace and security, both in the region and internationally. Accordingly, Egypt has put forward the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak's initiative of 1990 for the removal of all weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. The latter received extensive international support and was endorsed by the Security Council in paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991). In our estimation, this initiative constitutes the most appropriate framework for a balanced treatment of all weapons of mass destruction on a reciprocal and even-handed basis. Egypt also believes that the Security Council must assume its responsibilities under the Charter with a view to developing the appropriate framework to ensure the implementation of the two initiatives, for the consolidation of international peace and security.

(f) On the basis of the Security Council's primary role of maintaining international peace and security, the report refers to the subject of the maintenance of international peace and security indirectly through the report

of the Secretary-General entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) and defines the topic of the maintenance of international peace and security as comprising four elements, namely, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. However, the report does not mention the role of the Security Council, the highest political authority, in this matter. Egypt therefore stresses the close relationship between the Security Council and the implementation of disarmament agreements, on the basis of the provisions of Articles 24 and 26 of the United Nations Charter.

(g) The report refers to the question of "transparency in arms" as a confidence-building measure and stresses the funding of the Register so as to make it an effective instrument. I believe that making sufficient resources available for the purpose of the Register is a matter of priority and must be accorded great attention. In this regard, Egypt reiterates its emphasis on the need to expand the scope of the Register to include, in addition to stocks of conventional weapons, local production and components for weapons of mass destruction. While Egypt emphasizes the importance of the principle of transparency and openness as a characteristic of the modern age and an important element in confidence-building measures, reciprocal transparency is what we should seek to achieve, particularly when dealing with matters relating to conventional weapons. That would guarantee States the right of self-defence provided for in the United Nations Charter and ensure the maintenance of national security, with a view to the achievement of a quantitative and qualitative equivalence of military capacities for States in the same region. By giving the United Nations the principal role in the implementation of decisions relating to transparency, Egypt stresses the need to ensure equal rights and responsibilities for Member States and reciprocal and legally binding obligations for all States, without exception or discrimination.

(h) In the light of the close relationship between international security and disarmament and in view of the fact that the First Committee currently deals only to a limited extent with topics relating to international security, Egypt proposes that the First Committee's work on disarmament focus more intensively on international security and the scope of its treatment of this matter be expanded (report of the Secretary-General: study on the relationship between disarmament and international security (A/36/597)). This is emphasized in paragraph 67 of this study, which states that "strengthening international security becomes a primary and most important factor in promoting disarmament".

(i) In the context of dealing with the topic of disarmament mechanisms, Egypt stresses its support for all the sincere bilateral efforts that have culminated so far in the adoption of many important agreements on arms limitation. From another viewpoint, however, it wishes to stress the importance of United Nations multilateral efforts and mechanisms in the field of disarmament, which constitute a firm base for international efforts and reflect the hopes and conscience of the international community as a whole. In the light of the prevailing trend to restructure and reorganize United Nations bodies to accord with the realities of the age and in the wake of the

cold war, and in view of the relationship between the mechanisms operating in the field of disarmament within the framework of the United Nations through its three forums, the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly, Egypt agrees with the view expressed in the Secretary-General's report regarding the importance of reassessing the role of the three United Nations bodies active in the field of disarmament and considers that our point of departure in this reassessment process must be the acknowledgement of the prominent role played by the three bodies in the establishment of many of the foundations and principles that constitute the sound basis to build on in the future. The achievement of a higher degree of coordination between the three bodies is essential, especially in the light of international changes, for the advancement of disarmament efforts and the attainment of practical results in this matter. At the same time, one should not overlook the advantage that accrues from the independent character of the three bodies, which has afforded the members of the international community an opportunity to make progress in the objective treatment of disarmament issues. It should also be borne in mind that any reorganization of these bodies, whether formal or substantive, must, in order to ensure success, be based on the political will of the States members of those bodies and accord with their procedural norms. The United Nations bodies operating in the field of disarmament have encountered obstacles in their work as a result of cold-war conditions and policies of military confrontation that are now past. Thus, there is now a definite need to reassess the activity of United Nations bodies in the field of disarmament and to assess the features of the current international order and the extent of its impact on those bodies. In this connection, let us not omit to mention the role of the United Nations Secretariat, as represented in the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the contribution made by the Secretariat to the furtherance of disarmament efforts and the importance of supporting this role. Egypt hopes that the March 1993 meeting will constitute an appropriate opportunity for an exchange of views on disarmament bodies and other bodies operating within the United Nations system, with a view to consultation and coordination on relevant topics, first and foremost the achievement of effective consideration by the Conference on Disarmament of the items included in its agenda, the question of expanding its membership and the method of decision-making. Egypt proposes that the President of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission and the Secretariat of the United Nations be invited to participate in this meeting and to make statements reflecting the views of those bodies on the contents of the report of the Secretary-General.

(j) The subject of effective guarantees for the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon is part of the necessary groundwork for achieving effective measures for disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security. These guarantees are of the utmost importance, particularly following arrival at new agreements to curb nuclear armament. It is now imperative to give this matter the necessary impetus so as to meet the demands of the non-nuclear States that have acceded voluntarily to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and thus rejected the nuclear option. Mention should be made of the existence of

binding legal commitments concerning guarantees of security among the provisions and within the framework of certain regional non-proliferation treaties, such as the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, which gives rise to hope for similar treatment in the provisions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with a view to strengthening it and ensuring that the States of the region are not exposed to the risks of nuclear threat. To this end, Egypt has, since 1990, urged the necessity of reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which does not deal with this matter in its provisions, with effective guarantees of the security of all the States parties, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, which stipulates, inter alia, the necessity of adopting effective collective measures to prevent any threats to world peace through a collective security system. These provisions were taken as a basis by the Security Council in 1968 when it adopted resolution 255 (1968) on 19 June 1968. In view of the current changes in the international situation as compared with the world as it was in the latter part of the 1960s when the Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968), Egypt has requested that the subject of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States should be given fresh impetus by strengthening and developing the above-mentioned Security Council resolution, particularly now that all the nuclear States have acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for this fact constitutes a new and tangible reality on the way to the achievement of the universality of the goals and purposes of the ban on nuclear proliferation.

(k) In concluding Egypt's comments on the report, we emphasize the fundamental point to which we wish to draw attention with regard to the integration of the disarmament process in the plan for international peace and security, namely, the close relationship between the elements of national, regional and international security, inasmuch as any disruption of the balance of forces in any one of these elements disrupts the balance of security at all three levels. Hence the link between the measures and initiatives adopted by States to strengthen their national security and the elements of regional and international security.

Mongolia

[Original: English]

[19 February 1993]

1. Mongolia welcomes the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" (A/C.1/47/7) as an important and timely contribution to the efforts aimed at revitalizing the international disarmament process in the context of recent changes in the global security environment.

2. This report together with the Secretary-General's report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) provide a basis for the formulation of a broad conceptual framework to enhance the United Nations overall capabilities in the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The report contains both general philosophical ideas and practical proposals on specific issues. They all deserve careful consideration.

4. Because of their far-reaching implications, the ideas and proposals outlined in the report require a thorough reflection by the international community without the pressure of deadlines and time-frames.

5. In evaluating the report it is important not to lose sight of the growing role and prestige of the United Nations in world affairs, the ongoing process of restructuring and revitalization of the activities of the United Nations in general, and rationalization and streamlining of the work of its disarmament organs in particular. Of no less importance is the evaluation of disarmament support structures in the United Nations Secretariat. Efforts and activities in various directions concerning the restructuring of disarmament machinery and its support structures should be complementary and mutually reinforcing.

6. Mongolia holds that the priorities in the disarmament negotiations as established by the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament remain valid and relevant. In particular, Mongolia advocates the concentration of the efforts of the international community on such issues as non-proliferation of weapons, especially mass destruction weapons, comprehensive test ban, credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, conventional armaments and confidence-building measures. Mongolia also recognizes the importance of dealing with the emerging new "post-disarmament issues".

7. Mongolia supports the main thrust of the report embodied in the intertwined concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization. Obviously the practical implementation of these concepts should be carefully thought of and agreed on.

8. The Secretary-General's belief that disarmament efforts "should be closely coordinated with efforts in other fields and should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour ..." (A/C.1/47/7, para. 10) is fully shared by Mongolia.

9. While recognizing the close relationship between disarmament and other political and economic issues, including the fundamental problem of development, it would also be useful to point out that due to the sensitive nature of matters discussed and complex technical factors involved the disarmament process enjoys relative autonomy and cannot be tied up with the discussion of other problems or artificial time-frames.

10. The comprehensive system of mutually supplementary unilateral actions, bilateral agreements and multilateral arrangements at both global and regional level constitute a basic framework for the promotion of the globalization in disarmament affairs. Mongolia shares the Secretary-General's view that each and every State should be engaged in the process of disarmament and strive to make its contribution to its success.

11. The importance of a regional approach to disarmament issues, a balanced interrelationship between global, regional and subregional efforts cannot be overemphasized. Mongolia supports the identification by the Secretary-General of the questions of conventional armaments and confidence-building measures as important items on the regional and subregional disarmament agendas.

12. Proper attention should be given in this respect to the efforts to encourage and strengthen the regime of zones free from weapons of mass destruction in various parts of the world.

13. Globalization of the disarmament process is directly linked with the process of democratization of international relations as well as restructuring efforts within the United Nations disarmament organs. In this regard Mongolia believes that the process of globalization could benefit from a greater role of the United Nations General Assembly in the deliberation, negotiation and decision-making on all problems of global concern.

14. The enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament could also serve as an important measure to promote globalization in practical terms. Mongolia is convinced of the need to preserve balanced representation in this single multilateral negotiating body where countries, large and small, developed and developing, could make their own contribution.

15. It is true that disarmament is every State's business, but it is equally true that some States bear particularly enhanced responsibilities in making the world a less-armed and safer world. In this regard Mongolia welcomes the ongoing process of bilateral nuclear arms reduction, anticipates further achievements in this field and expects other nuclear-weapon Powers to join the process.

16. An idea to entrust the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate to permanently review and supervise some existing multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements should be carefully studied. As it stands now Mongolia has a concern that the actual implementation of this idea may run into legal and technical difficulties and moreover divert over time the attention of the Conference on Disarmament from its main task of negotiating global arms control agreements.

17. Mongolia supports the strengthening, within United Nations resources, of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and advocates its further orientation towards more forward-looking and practical tasks.

18. The establishment of "a coordinated system which would allow the international community to address major disarmament problems promptly, flexibly and efficiently" (A/C.1/47/7, para. 43) may prove to be an elusive goal to reach. It is difficult but possible to "promptly, flexibly and efficiently" deploy peace-keeping forces in various parts of the world or address consequences of a particular natural or man-made disaster. But it is something different to try to conclude in the same manner a global agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons, to name but an example. The

establishment of such a system could be construed as a long-term goal of the international community in the quest for which it should bear in mind the importance and peculiarities of the matters concerned.

19. Mongolia supports the idea of a greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council could take upon itself a more active arms regulation and disarmament role in discharging its main task of maintaining international peace and security.

20. In general, the United Nations disarmament machinery works and produces results. The years-long negotiations on a chemical weapons convention proved too vividly that the existence and/or absence of political will is a decisive factor in the success or failure of disarmament or, for that matter. any other efforts.

New Zealand

[Original: English]

[22 February 1993]

1. New Zealand welcomes the Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" (A/C.1/47/7). In particular, we welcome the assurance that disarmament will remain one of the central functions of the United Nations. The analysis provided by the Secretary-General under the three themes "integration", "globalization" and "revitalization" lends clarity to the wider subject. Taken overall the themes underline the principle that security and arms control are matters that should involve all States; they are an assertion that to be effective the nature of the process must be inclusive, and that all States have a responsibility to contribute.

2. New Zealand is convinced that the United Nations has a critical role to play in promoting and mediating practical measures of disarmament and strengthening international security. The end of the bipolar world considerably enhances opportunities for the United Nations to play this role more effectively, and relevant United Nations organs must be reviewed to reflect better the changed global circumstances. Accordingly:

(a) United Nations responsibility in the field of disarmament should be strengthened and closely integrated with its security-related activities;

(b) Appropriate United Nations organs should provide the focus by which the post-cold war community achieves consensus on interrelated disarmament, security and non-proliferation issues;

(c) The United Nations can play a role in monitoring and reviewing compliance with relevant disarmament measures and considering appropriate

action with regard to transgressions. In serious cases of non-compliance with fundamental obligations undertaken pursuant to such instruments as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the imposition of sanctions should be considered;

(d) Regional approaches to disarmament and arms control should be encouraged by the United Nations both as a complement to global efforts and as an essential component of a broader peace-building process in regions suffering from instability;

(e) States must work to prevent excessive build-ups of conventional arms. In this regard the process known as transparency in armaments, embracing as its cornerstone the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and constituting a most important confidence-building measure, must continue to be given strong support.

3. United Nations disarmament machinery. The United Nations disarmament machinery was established and adopted its basic goals in the circumstances of the cold war. It is essential that these should be adapted to today's needs. There are still issues to be settled which were current during the period of East-West confrontation, such as a comprehensive test ban, verification in the biological weapons convention, and outer space. But there are pressing new problems arising from today's circumstances, such as the need to defuse ethnic tensions, to provide assurances to States unsure of changed political structures in their region, or to remove a perception of threat by encouraging openness in arms transfers. Members of the United Nations should show the flexibility needed to grapple with the world as it is, and not persist in seeking to tackle issues which have lost relevance. New Zealand is eager to take part in this process and to contribute to the real progress which is now within reach.

4. New Zealand's views on the various components of the collective disarmament machinery of the United Nations are as follows:

(a) First Committee: This remains the central political organ in which members of the international community can raise disarmament and arms control questions, either by way of airing concerns or by proposing the adoption of decisions. In exercising these functions the Committee is indispensable, but its working methods need to be kept under review to ensure that the time available to the Committee is used most productively. In New Zealand's view the following measures would be desirable:

(i) Full merger of disarmament and international security items, both as to general debate and consideration and action on resolutions. It was apparent at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly that as a result of the separation of consideration of disarmament and security items insufficient attention was given to the security resolutions, and the outcome was unsatisfactory;

(ii) Reform of the agenda: some items on the First Committee's agenda have titles which are not relevant to the present day; related issues are often for merely historical reasons dealt with under different item headings which do not respond to present-day opportunities;

(iii) Encouragement to merge further texts: there are still too many resolutions on the same subject, in some cases submitted purely because a sponsor would like to use the text to advance a narrow aspect of its external policy. In the new climate the aim should be to reconcile differences and establish agreed single positions;

(iv) The general debate, while fulfilling a useful function and providing an opportunity for Member States to air views publicly, could be subject to tighter discipline by way of length of interventions and time allocated to it;

(v) The idea could be considered of designating a theme for debate during each session of the Committee - not necessarily with a view to adopting a resolution, deliberating in depth or coming to agreed conclusions, but rather to generate ideas and indicate attitudes; given the greater climate of openness a sounding of opinion in a relatively informal way would be useful in identifying new trends in thinking and possible avenues for further follow-up.

(b) Conference on Disarmament: While its overall record is mixed, the accomplishment of the chemical weapons convention is evidence of the great value the international community obtains from a multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Negotiating about national security is however a sensitive matter, so the manner of constituting the Conference on Disarmament depended very much on prevailing perceptions of threat. What was decided for the cold war is clearly unsuited to today's world. New Zealand is pleased that the Conference has embarked on a self review. We consider that this review should be all encompassing to ensure that an organ that has developed specialized expertise in particular circumstances acknowledges that the expertise needs to adapt in other circumstances. New Zealand believes attention should focus on:

(i) Membership: The threefold pattern (East-West-Non-aligned) must be made more flexible. Expansion of the Conference on Disarmament should be accompanied by a new approach to participation. New Zealand favours an open-ended arrangement. It is not uncommon for matters of prime national concern to be negotiated on a multilateral basis by every country which wished to participate. If open-endedness is not accepted for the Conference then some formula should be found which does not induce a sense of exclusion for any country likely to be affected by the matter under negotiation.

(ii) Agenda: The Conference on Disarmament must not concern itself with matters which are well beyond the realm of the currently achievable and not relevant to today's realities. It should keep to a

practical and realistic agenda dealing with major issues about which the international community is at present concerned and in a position to negotiate. New Zealand believes that the items for which the Conference has established ad hoc committees for its 1993 session (comprehensive test ban, transparency in armaments, negative security assurances, outer space) are realistic. Success in these topics would make a real difference to many countries' sense of security. They are enough to keep the Conference occupied for some time.

(c) Disarmament Commission: New Zealand has strongly supported measures to streamline the agenda and working methods of the Disarmament Commission. Some important improvements to the working methods of the Commission have been achieved in recent years. However, further improvements are necessary if the Commission is to justify its continuance and take advantage of the opportunities that now seem available for advancing multilateral disarmament issues. We believe that work within the Commission should be focused on specific proposals which are likely to attract consensus. That said, it is also apparent that delegations are often unready during the course of the annual session to demonstrate the necessary commitment and flexibility to take discussion of specific issues forward to the next stage. Accordingly, we believe that in some instances intersessional or pre-sessional consultations on specific issues could play a useful role in facilitating concrete progress on issues. Looking ahead and bearing in mind that the various disarmament forums were designed to play separate but complementary roles, the need to maintain a separate institution for multilateral disarmament deliberations will have to be reviewed in the light of developments with respect to other disarmament forums. In particular, reforms to the working methods and scope of membership of the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee might eventually subsume the functions of the Disarmament Commission. Its continued value should be kept under scrutiny.

(d) Office for Disarmament Affairs: The post-cold war era provides opportunities for real progress. The international community, in moving forward in multilateral disarmament, needs a strong international secretariat to support meetings, coordinate progress internationally as well as regionally where appropriate, and to carry out key tasks and functions laid upon it. A prime example of such functions is the maintenance and operation of the Register of Conventional Arms. We also recognize the important role played by the Office for Disarmament Affairs in coordinating the activities of the regional disarmament centres. Under the medium-term plan the Secretary-General is engaged in an overall restructuring of the United Nations to make it more efficient and responsive to today's needs without an increase in the budget. New Zealand fully supports this action. Within this context we hope that attention given to the Office for Disarmament Affairs will ensure that it is adequately staffed to permit it to operate the Register and also to carry out its other important tasks and coordinating functions in the field of disarmament and arms control.

5. Conclusion. The various multilateral disarmament bodies clearly need to keep their working methods under constant review to ensure that they remain capable of effectively addressing the challenges of a changing world. The resumed session of the First Committee provides an excellent opportunity for Member States to indicate their views on the improvements that need to be made. The Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace" deals with different aspects of conflict resolution. Later, in "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" he noted that all such aspects can be supported and strengthened by concrete measures of arms regulation and disarmament. Peace enforcement may require the imposition of certain aspects of disarmament. Moreover (as noted in para. 2 (c) above) certain disarmament measures may require enforcement action by the international community. In all this it is clear that the work of the General Assembly and the work of the Security Council, while distinct, should be complementary.

Republic of Korea

[Original: English]

[23 February 1993]

1. The Republic of Korea holds in high regard the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" (A/C.1/47/7), which addresses a number of fundamental issues regarding the efforts of the United Nations in the area of disarmament. The Republic of Korea concurs with the view that a new approach to this field must be found, particularly in the new environment that has emerged following the end of the cold war. Towards this end, we believe it is important to carefully review, above all else, the United Nations disarmament machinery.

2. Multilateral disarmament is a continuous process, starting from the identification of problem areas and agenda-setting and progressing on to negotiation, treaty-making, verification and, in the event of non-compliance, also the imposition of sanctions. We believe it is important to bear in mind these characteristics of multilateral disarmament as we evaluate the role of the United Nations disarmament machinery. While we feel it requires some modification, we do not, in general, view the current United Nations system with pessimism.

3. The United Nations system centres on the First Committee, which, assisted by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations study groups and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, serves as the umbrella organization for disarmament issues. Its functions are to set the agenda and determine priorities. Meanwhile, the Disarmament Commission provides a forum for in-depth deliberation on selected issues, while negotiation of treaties is conducted within the sole body for such activity, the Conference on Disarmament. With these mechanisms at our disposal, the Republic of Korea

does not see a reason for a sweeping reform of the troika, the tripod structure consisting of the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, or of the functional relationships between these groups. Rather, we believe attention should focus on ensuring that each of them functions in a more rational manner.

4. (a) As the umbrella organization in the field of disarmament, the First Committee should deal with a broad spectrum of disarmament issues, including non-military aspects. We believe, however, that the agenda should be formulated in a manner that better reflects the concerns of Member States as well as the changing realities around the world. Further, we feel it is time that items on the agenda are merged to avoid duplication, as not a few items are closely related but have been dealt with separately for historical reasons.

(b) In addition, the current three-stage formula of addressing issues in the First Committee through general debate, deliberation, and action on draft resolutions must be modified.

(c) With respect to the general debate, which gives all Member States an opportunity to present their overall views on disarmament, we believe it should rightfully be maintained but that the time permitted for each presentation should be reduced.

(d) The second stage needs to proceed in a more focused and orderly manner to allow for genuine deliberation. Under the current system, the "deliberation of all items" has proved inefficient in facilitating an exchange of views. Discussing the agenda items on the basis of systematic and logically structured clusters would better achieve true dialogue and discussion.

5. (a) We recognize that much has recently been done to streamline the work of the Disarmament Commission, including the decision at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly to introduce a phased approach, thereby helping the Commission to function more rationally.

(b) We believe, however, that there is a need to review the practice of general debates in the Disarmament Commission since it is not an agenda-setting organ like the First Committee but rather a forum of discussion for selected issues. In this light, we do not believe it is necessary to have the plenary meetings for general exchanges of views in this forum, omission of which would shorten the length of the sessions of the Commission.

6. (a) Regarding the Conference on Disarmament, it has been productive in the area of treaty-making and now counts among its successes the conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons. Its predecessors were also successful over the years in negotiating several significant multilateral disarmament agreements, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the biological weapons convention and the environmental modification techniques (ENMOD). Today, however, we find that the legitimacy of the Conference on Disarmament is impaired by its composition, which is a product

of the cold war. With that period of history behind us, it stands to reason that the composition of the Conference should be altered to reflect, not the past, but the present. A diverse range of opinions on the expansion of membership has been presented. We are of the view that all nations that wish to join the Conference on Disarmament should have the opportunity to do so. An expansion of the membership of the Conference concurs with the very idea of globalization put forward by the Secretary-General in the said report.

(b) With regard to the working agenda of the Conference, the items included in it should be realistic and well-defined, and their number should be limited to help the Conference to function more effectively as a negotiating body.

7. Looking back on the disarmament process mentioned in paragraph 2, it is clear that the United Nations disarmament machinery lacks the mechanisms to ensure implementation of treaties and conduct verification. Verification has been the subject of a number of diverse proposals, including the Disarmament Agency, the International Space Monitoring Agency, the Agency for the Processing of Satellite Image, to name a few. The issue was discussed in great depth in the report of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification (A/45/372 and Corr.1). Even though it may appear difficult to establish a permanent, centralized United Nations verification mechanism in the near future, we believe it will be imperative to do so in the longer run. In this connection, it is meaningful that the General Assembly has requested in resolution 47/45, a follow-up study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.

8. In closing, the Republic of Korea hopes to see the role of the Security Council in disarmament strengthened. In the absence of a centralized verification mechanism, we believe a greater role for the Security Council, particularly in ad hoc verification, should be encouraged while sanctions or other measures are reinforced to cope with cases of non-compliance.